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Abstract: Costs of environmental regulations, although relatively small, can be critical in the
competitiveness of a product since the cost advantages of producers in one country are often
very slim.  Additional costs derived from new regulations are a factor in the continued
importance of exports and of the maintaining or increasing a nation’s share of the international
market.  Governments try to assist their industries in overcoming the disadvantages caused by
such added cost through subsidies, tax breaks, technical assistance or in other ways.  In
agriculture these are increasingly taking the form of green payments, which are currently exempt
from the limits imposed on domestic subsidies.  In addition to these mechanisms for addressing
the environment, there also has been a selective but subversive process of erecting non-tariff
barriers based on environmental protection issues.  It is often difficult to determine if such
measures are really for protecting the environment or for protecting domestic producers.  They
are, none-the-less, generally effective approaches for achieving environmental objectives and
can also be effective measures to alter competitiveness.  Competitiveness can be either enhanced
or diminished by the environmental regimes of competing nations.  The existence of negative
externalities means that prices are lower than would prevail if all costs where included in the
prices of the products.  
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Environmental Regulations and Competitiveness
Dale Colyer
Most production and consumption activities have side effects including the creation of
waste products that must be disposed of in the environment and that tend to damage and degrade
natural ecosystems.  Public policy measures (regulations and/or incentives) to protect and
enhance the environment have a long history, but have become much more important in recent
decades.  Environmental concerns in the U.S. attained critical status during the 1960s, an era
exemplified by the 1962 publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring.  Subsequently, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was established by the Federal Government and the
U.S. Congress, as well as many state legislatures, has passed a large body of environmental
legislation including, at the Federal level, the Clean Air and Water Acts, pesticide regulation,
solid waste disposal rules, contaminated site cleanup funding, the endangered species acts,
recycling provisions, etc.  There also has been a host of multinational activities through
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) such as those controlling trade in endangered
species (CITES), banning of use of chlorofluorocarbons to prevent the enlargement of the ozone
hole, maintaining biodiversity, controlling greenhouse gas emissions, etc.  Trade agreements
became a factor in this web of environmental activities with the inclusion of environmental
provisions in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Uruguay round of
the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), which also established the World Trade
Organization (WTO).  Most other nations have environmental regulations which vary from
extremely strong in most industrialized countries to very weak in a few of the least developed
countries, which neither have the resources nor will for stronger measures to protect the
environment.
Environmental regulation is used here to designate the wide variety of measures and tools
used to prevent, control and/or mitigate environmental damage resulting from production and
consumption activities of human beings.  These include the use of police power, i.e., laws and
regulations that prohibit actions that cause environmental damage or require actions that improve
the environment and that are enforceable by civil or criminal actions through the courts or semi-
judicial bodies, pollution taxes such as taxes on emissions, market related activities implemented
through government such as trading in emission rights, and subsidies or other incentives to
induce individuals and firms to adopt methods that protect or improve the environment. They
also include measures used to reverse damages caused by past activities such as clean up of
pollution sites, surface mine reclamation, etc.  Some environmental organizations have been very
active in promoting public actions to protect the environment as well as in carrying out privately
supported activities; some organizations, however, have been destructive of private and public
property and exhibit extreme biases toward the environment.
It is sometimes difficult to determine if a particular activity or regulation should be
classified as environmental, health, quality of life, or other measure since they are interrelated
and many have multiple objectives, including protectionism (see, e.g., Charnovitz 2002).  For
example, genetically modified organisms may be regulated or prohibited for health or
environmental reasons or both.  Sanitary/phytosanitary provisions are imposed for protecting the
health of people, animals or plants and for environmental reasons, such as prevention of the
introduction of harmful species of plants or animals, including insects, as well as bacteria or2
viruses that cause diseases, but they may also be set up specifically to protect a domestic
industry from competition (O’Connor 2003).
Although much of the environmental regulation was directed at industrial production,
agriculture was affected as well, especially by the pesticides regulation and clean water acts.
Agriculture has been and continues to be a major contributor to environmental degradation (see,
for example, Bromley 1966; Peterson, Boisvert, and de Gorter 2002; Srivastava and Alderman 1993;
Tilman et al. 2001).  These legacies include soil erosion; pesticide contamination and poisoning;
fertilizer runoff and volatilization; air pollution and green house gas generation through dust,
fossil fuel burning, land clearing, and animal flatulence; water depletion through irrigation and
an accompanying soil salinization and compaction; loss of biodiversity as land is cleared and
mono-agricultural production techniques used; and perceived threats to health via genetically
modified organisms (GMO), hormone and antibiotics utilized in animal feeds, pesticide
contamination of fruits and vegetables, etc.  In the water area, much of the industrial and
municipal point pollution problem has been successfully addressed and, consequently, attention
has turned to non-point pollution with agriculture as a major culprit.  Fertilizer and chemical
runoffs are major contributors to non-point water pollution.  Large scale poultry, pork, dairy and
beef production units have led to major problems associated with animal waste disposal,
especially as that relates to water pollution.  Because of these and related issues agriculture has
become subject to a greater variety of environmental regulations, regulations that the sector was
often exempted from in the past when regulatory measures were applied to other industries.
Environmental regulations are an issue in competitiveness since they may increase the
costs of production, making those who are affected less competitive than producers not facing
similar regulations.  In addition, environmental issues and protection have become important to
many consumers and others with environmental concerns who seek to impose restrictions on
what products can be marketed or the circumstances under which they can be sold.  Thus, U.S.
environmentalists and consumers have been able to persuade Congress to ban imports of tuna
caught in ways that harm dolphins and shrimp in ways that kill sea turtles (Hudson et al. 2003),
while Europeans have banned beef fed with hormones and have a moratorium on food produced
from genetically modified seeds.  Similarly citrus and other products from certain areas may be
banned due to fruit flies and other pests–the control of invasive species is critical to the health of
domestic industries and the general environment, including biodiversity (see Evans 2003).  Other
countries ban imports of poultry with any disease causing organisms such as salmonella,
sometimes causing a virtual ban on imports, or which are produced in countries where there have
been disease outbreaks–nearly everyone banned imports of beef from Great Britain during the
mad cow crisis and the foot and mouth disease outbreak.  These environmentally related non-
tariff barriers to trade are also a factor in the competitiveness of agriculture, including the ability
of U.S. agriculture to sell in many markets.  While regulations related to agricultural production
are important, an increasing share of U.S. agricultural exports are in the form or processed
products and, thus, regulations that affect the food processing industries also are a factor in the
sector’s competitiveness.
This section of the paper examines the competitiveness of agriculture as it is affected by
environmental regulations.  It includes an examination of the conceptual (theoretical and
practical) bases for the effects of environmental regulations on competitiveness, which are
covered in the next section.  Then, agriculture’s contributions to environmental problems are
covered.  Following that, the nature of U.S. general and agricultural sector’s environmental
regulations vis-B-vis its major competitors will be discussed; this will include regulations3
affecting agricultural production and those affecting industries that process agricultural products.
Next, the role, extent and importance of environmentally related non-tariff barriers will be
examined.  This will be followed by a review and evaluation of research related to the effects of
environmental regulations on the competitiveness of U.S. agricultural producers and processors.
The final part of this section contains the conclusions and implications of environmental
regulations for the competitiveness of U.S. agriculture.
Conceptual Underpinnings
The creation of waste products during production (consumption) causes costs, which are
not borne by the producer (consumer) but by other persons or society in general (hereafter the
discussion focuses on production but the reader should remember that the material also generally
applies to consumption).  These costs are called externalities since they are not reflected in the
prices of the products, but are borne by those not involved in the particular economic
transactions (see Zilberman and Marra, 1993).  Air and water pollution are typical examples of
externalities that producers create, including producers and processors of agricultural
commodities.  The major effect of the externalities is that the prices of the products are lower
than they would be if all costs were included.  This results in more of the product being
demanded and produced, and more environmental damage.  Thus, creation of externalities can be
viewed as a form of indirect subsidization of the producer, an environmental subsidy since it is
the environment and general public that suffer as a result.  Environmental regulations are applied
to reduce or eliminate undesirable externalities such as pollution and act, in effect, to internalize
the costs, to make the prices more closely reflect the total costs of production, including the
externalities.
The existence of externalities affects competitiveness since the indirect subsidies they
provide to producers enable them to charge lower prices and makes their products more
competitive.  Elimination of externalities through their internalization will tend to raise prices of
the products, making them less competitive, at least if other producers, say those in other
countries, are not affected by a similar process of internalization.  Furthermore, even when both
countries have similar regulations, competitiveness may be affected if one country is more
efficient in carrying out its regulatory regime or does not enforce it equally.  In addition, many
countries attempt to mitigate the effects of their environmental regulations on costs through
various types of subsidies, including faster tax write-offs for pollution equipment, direct
payments or other incentives.  The latter include the green payments made to farmers, payments
explicitly exempted by the WTO rules, which attempt to limit domestic subsidization of
agricultural production in ways that distort trade.  The U.S., for example, has used cost sharing
for soil conservation and other practices through the Soil Conservation Service (SCS), now
Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) since the 1930s (Batie 1998).  Although the
purpose was to promote conservation and not to enhance competitiveness, that has been one of
the results.  These types of subsidies tend to have long-run effects from improved efficiency
through protecting and enhancing the productivity of the soil or other natural resources.  The
subsidization of water from irrigation facilities provided by the public also enhances productivity
and competitiveness, at least in the short-run.  It also should be remembered that changes in
costs due to environmental regulations will not necessarily result in changes in the direction, or
even magnitude, of trade flows since it is comparative not absolute advantage that is the
determining factor (Bhagwati 1996).4
Many countries have attempted to protect their agricultural sectors through various types
of trade barriers, both tariff and non-tariff types of barriers.  Tariffs are transparent and have
been the primary targets of GATT/WTO negotiations, although agricultural issues were excluded
from most rounds of negotiations prior to the Uruguay Round, completed in 1994.  Non-tariff
barriers have included various devices including licensing requirements, quotas or import
prohibitions, various types of sanitary/phytosanitary provisions (which may be legitimate
measures used to protect human, animal and plant health), labeling requirements and other
devices to restrict trade.  One step to resolve these issues and eliminate non-tariff barriers made
during the Uruguay Round was the tariffication of many non-tariff barriers, i.e., their conversion
to tariffs, which were then to be reduced and eventually eliminated (Josling et al. 1994).  This
process resulted in very high tariffs for agricultural products in several countries.  The
negotiations also allowed appropriate regulations for health purposes if those were based on
science and applied equally to domestic producers and all producers of imported products.
Article XX of GATT allows environmental regulations as exceptions to the prohibition of trade
barriers where these are imposed to protect human, animal and plant health, but the exact
interpretation of this provision has been and continues to be a controversial subject, especially
when applied unilaterally by one country, as in the cases of tuna-dolphin and shrimp-sea turtle
regulations imposed by the U.S.
Agriculture and the Environment
Agricultural production and related activities produce significant externalities, i.e., have
important negative effects on the environment that have led to government policies that are
designed to eliminate or, at least, mitigate those effects.  One critique, for example, says, “This
eutrophication and habitat destruction would cause unprecedented ecosystem simplification, loss
of ecosystem services, and species extinctions” (Tilman et al. 2001, p. 281).  However, they also
indicate that it may be possible to minimize or even reverse some of the trends leading to these
pessimistic forecasts with appropriate mechanisms, but these cannot be achieved unless “far
more resources are dedicated to their discovery and implementation” (p. 284).  These
externalities exist as activities that affect the natural resources used by farmers (land, water, air)
or the health of humans or other living organisms.  Soil erosion and other forms of soil
degradation (compacting, salinization, water logging etc.) are results of farming activities,
primarily crop production although livestock production also can be a factor, as in the case of
overgrazing.  Water quality is affected by siltation resulting from erosion and from runoff into
streams or percolation into ground water of agricultural chemicals or from animal wastes.  Air
quality is adversely affected by wind erosion, burning of fossil fuels, land clearing through
burning, and odors produced by concentrated livestock production.  Biodiversity is diminished
when farming activities such as land clearing or wetland drainage destroy the habitat of wildlife,
fish, insects, etc. or through poisoning from pesticides (Carson 1962).
The effects of agriculture on the environment have been subject to considerable research
(see, for example, Bromley 1996; Claassen et al. 2001).  Bromley (1996, p. 3) recognizes both
positive and negative externalities associated with agriculture and classifies them into three
categories, those with amenity, habitat, or ecological implications.  In this paper, the concern is
only with the negative implications, since these are the ones leading to most of the regulations
that have implications for competitiveness (although some, particularly the amenity benefits,
may have cost implications and may be affected or required to some degree by5
regulations–especially in Europe).  Claassen et al. (2001, p. 2) list a number of negative
environmental impacts produced by agriculture.  Principal among these are water quality
problems caused by sediments (soil erosion), runoff of water with dissolved nutrients, especially
nitrogen but also phosphorus, and herbicide/pesticide contamination of water.  They report
research that indicates sediments as a major source of water quality problems and that there are
high concentrations of nitrogen in water as a result of fertilizers and animal wastes which, for
example, causes eutrophication in the Gulf of Mexico and other water bodies–an estimate is that
15 percent of the nitrogen and 3 percent of the pesticides used in the drainage area make it into
the Gulf of Mexico.  Some 37 percent of the ground water tested by the U.S. Geological Survey
has at least minor traces of the principal herbicides used in farming.  Reductions in water levels
from excessive pumping of ground water can lead to subsidence and loss of productivity, while
improper irrigation procedures cause salinization and/or water logging of land.  Claassen et al.
also say “soil particulate, farm chemicals, and odor from livestock are in the air we breathe” (p.
2).  They further indicate that of the 643 species on the federal list of endangered species,
agriculture has contributed to 380 being on that list. Wetlands conversions, an average of 31,000
acres per year during 1982-92, have been an important factor in that loss of biodiversity.
This brief summary of the environmental impacts of agriculture indicates the seriousness
of the problems, which have been a major factor in the increases in regulatory activities in recent
years and may be an indication of additional regulation in the future.  Agriculture had been
exempt from many of the regulations that affected industrial concerns, but as the sector has
become characterized more by larger sizes of operations and control by large-scale processors of
the products, much of the justification for exempting ‘family farms’ from regulations no longer
applies.  In addition, the relatively recent growth in concern for the environment has become a
major political influence that affects agricultural and other legislation.  One environmentalist, for
example, called the 1996 Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act (FAIR) a triumph
for conservation (Warman 1996).  It included regulatory features, although continuing the use of
incentives, an approach utilized for agricultural conservation activities since 1933.
U.S. Environmental Regulation of Agriculture
The United States has a strong set of environmental regulations, but its environmental
regulation regime is not as strong as those of a number of other industrial countries.  In Esty and
Porter’s environmental regulation regime index the U.S. ranks fourteenth, behind most of the
major European countries as well as Singapore, but slightly higher than Belgium, Australia,
Japan and Norway–Finland ranks number one followed by Sweden, Singapore and the
Netherlands (Esty and Porter 2002, p. 93).  The less developed countries along with Russia and
other transition countries, generally ranked in the bottom half of the 70 countries included in the
index–there was not sufficient data on many countries, including most African nations.  This
index represents the overall environmental regulation regime and, thus, does not apply
specifically to agriculture, although regulation in agriculture is probably similar.
In the U.S., agricultural production activities are regulated primarily through three
Federal Agencies, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA, also one of agriculture’s primary
supporters), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Department of the
Interior–this latter through the Endangered Species Act.  In agriculture, the historical approach
by the Federal Government has been principally one of incentives to induce improvements in the
environment, an activity initiated in the 1930s with the SCS (now NRCS).  The principal6
regulatory/support activities related to the environment in the agricultural sector are shown in
Table 1.  Historically, the USDA has been the primary Federal agency involved in the
agricultural sector, for both support and regulatory activities.  The Department of the Interior has
been involved through the Forest Service and federal lands, while the Corps of Engineers has
been important through projects dealing with navigable streams and other agencies have had
some involvement.  States also have environmental regulations, which vary significantly and 
Table 1. Environmental Regulations/Assistance Affecting Agriculture
Resource/Input Law/Regulation Policy Tool
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Wildlife Endangered Species Act Regulations
Labeling Organic Certification Standards
Source: ERS (see: http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefingconservation...)
a. Subject to regulations, if voluntary programs fail to achieve goals.
b. Regulations apply to those who opt to participate in income support programs.
c. Most states have Right to Farm Laws, which provide some protection to farmers from
nuisance lawsuits based on their farming activities (nuisance suits based on common law are
possible for other types of pollution activities, Levi and Colyer 1972).
have effects on the location of agricultural production, especially concentrated livestock
production such as pork and poultry (Hurt 1994; see Ribaudo et al. 2003, p. 10 for a summary of
types of state regulations).
The EPA has become increasingly important since it was founded in the 1970s as the
primary agency for handling environmental problems and issues in the United States.  As most
problems involved with point pollution of water from industrial and municipal sources were
solved and it became clear that non-point pollution was the major remaining major water quality
problem, agriculture has become a focus as the major contributor to that type of water pollution
(Ribaudo 2003; Ribaudo et al. 2003).
The USDA’s environmentally related programs have been, and continue to be, primarily
voluntary in nature with incentives used to induce farmer participation.  These became important
during the New Deal era of the 1930s with the founding of the Soil Conservation Service,7
although research and educational programs had existed previously with the Cooperative
Extension Service and other USDA programs promoting improved farming practices through
research and educational programs.  The SCS, through cost sharing for soil and water
conservation practices, has had important impacts for the environment.  These, it might be noted,
tended to be positive for competitiveness, as they tended to enhance agricultural productivity. 
Changes in farm support programs from price to income support programs in the 1985
Food Security Act, also changed the environmental role of the USDA, since the act required
compliance with environmental programs to maintain eligibility for income support payments
and made the USDA the enforcement agency (Claassen et al. 2003).  The 1985 act had three
types of compliance requirements.  Under the conservation compliance provision, farmers with
highly erodible land were required to comply with basic conservation practices to remain
eligible for support payments.  Sodbuster provisions required that farmers who brought highly
erodible land into production comply with stricter conservation practices, i.e., stricter than those
already farming such land.  The swampbuster portion of the act meant that farmers who
converted wetlands to cropland could lose all benefits.  These provisions have been continued in
agricultural acts subsequent to 1985, including the 2002 act.  The acts also have provisions to
assist those who chose not to comply due to cost or for other reasons.  They could, for example,
enroll their land in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), i.e., be paid for taking their land
out of production.  The importance of these provisions is that the government established a set of
standards or practices, which used the leverage of the support programs to induce improved
practices that would benefit the environment, while not requiring direct additional budget
outlays.  The government, however, did continue to provide technical assistance needed to
enable farmers to comply with the conservation requirements through SCS programs.
The compliance requirements assisted in improving water quality through reduced runoff
and erosion from cropland, but had little or no effect on the water quality problems caused by
livestock operations and these became subject to more direct regulatory requirements through
the EPA and clean water act.  However, direct regulatory provisions affect agriculture in a
number of areas (Claassen et al. 2001).  These include the Coastal Zone Reauthorization Act
which includes provisions to reduce non-point runoff from agricultural land in protected coastal
waters, the Clean Water Act regulation of dredging and filling of wet lands, the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act which regulates (and bans some) materials used in
agricultural production, and the Endangered Species Act which can affect farming activities in
areas where listed species exist, i.e., affects the habitats of species in danger of extinction.  In
addition, recently developed EPA regulations on handling and disposal of animal wastes from
concentrated production units are affecting those operations and their costs (Ribaudo 2003;
Ribaudo et al. 2003).
The EPA under the Clean Water Act established requirements for manure handling for
concentrated livestock feeding operations (CAFOs), i.e., those with over 1,000 animal units and
defined as 2,500 hogs (over 55 pounds), 1,000 beef cattle, 700 dairy cattle, 120,000 broilers,
82,000 laying hens, 55,000 turkeys, 30,000 ducks, 1,000 veal calves, 10,000 sheep and 500
horses–smaller sizes if liquid manure systems are used (EPA 2003).  However, as sizes have
grown and concentration in some regions increased, the original provisions proved to be
inadequate.  Consequently, as result of a joint USDA-EPA study and analysis a new set of
regulations was developed, and signed by the EPA administrator on December 15, 2002 (EPA
2003; Ribaudo 2003, p. 31).  These were published in the Federal Register February 12, 2003 (as
a 100-page document) and went into effect April 14, 2003.  They are being implemented, will be8
in full force in 2006, and will affect many producers–they are mandatory for the large producers
and recommended for smaller operations.  It should be noted that they apply to the farm unit, the
producer, and not to the contractor who often owns the animals and controls the production
process.  They apply to the distribution of manure on land as well as to the handling of the
manure on site, and still involve voluntary aspects.  An EPA official is quoted as saying “The
goal in regulating concentrated animal feeding operations has been to develop a mix of voluntary
approaches and regulation” (quoted in Bury 2003, p. 4).
The distribution of manure on land became a problem with increased concentration that
causes excess nutrients to exist in many areas, i.e., more than can be utilized by the plants
produced on the land in the area.  This is to be handled by requiring that each operation develop
and implement a comprehensive nutrient management plan that is “technically sound,
economically feasible, and site-specific” (Ribaudo 2003, p. 34).  Because land spreading of all
manure in the local area is not feasible in some regions and transportation tends to be too
expensive, some producers are developing alternative methods of disposing of or, rather, uses for
the manure.  PerdueAgriRecycle and Harmony Farms Shenandoah Valley (HSV), for example,
operate fertilizer plants in Delaware and Virginia, respectively, to convert chicken manure into
fertilizer (Ribaudo et al. 2003).
Competitor Environmental Regulation of Agriculture
The U.S. produces and exports many agricultural products and, thus, many countries are
competitors.  However, the principal ones for the more important agricultural exports in terms of
value or volume include the European Union, Canada and, increasingly, Brazil and Argentina.
The EU and other industrialized countries tend to have strong environmental programs including
regulations affecting agriculture, although like the U.S. and Canada have depended extensively
on voluntary and incentive programs (Brethour et al. 2002; Ozanne, Hogan and Colman 2001).
As in the U.S. stronger or mandatory requirements are being considered and/or implemented
(Brethour et al. 2002; Oskam, Vijftigschild and Graveland 1997). The EU’s environmental
regulations, while varying among the member countries, tend to be stronger than in the U.S.
(see, e.g., Larson 2002; Metcalfe 2002); the EU, though its parliament, issues directives that
member countries are expected to enforce through national legislation, but there is considerable
variation from country to country in how the directives are carried out.  An example is the nitrate
directive, which is to limit the use of products, such as fertilizers and manures that contaminate
water.  Canada’s regulations are similar to those of the U.S., at least with respect to the costs
they impose (Metcalfe 2002). Much of the Canadian regulation is at the provincial level, but
tends to be similar among the various provinces (Brethour et al. 2002); as in the U.S.
environmental spillovers from concentrated agricultural enterprises has been an inducement
toward increased regulation (Mussell and Martin 2000).  Brazil and Argentina, as developing
countries, have less stringent environmental regulations and are becoming major competitors of
the U.S. in agricultural trade, although this is more related to their lower land and labor costs
than to their environmental regimes (see Schnepf, Dohlman and Bolling 2001).
Effects of Regulations on Competitiveness
Relatively little research has been carried out on the effect of environmental regulations
on the competitiveness of agricultural products in international markets, perhaps because it had9
not been an important issue.  Environmental regulations have been an important topic in trade
and competitiveness for industrial and mineral production since at least the early 1990s, when
they were a major concern in the development of the North American Free Trade Agreement and
became an issue in the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT);
they are very important in the current, Doha, round of World Trade Organization (WTO)
negotiations (see Huang and Labys, 2002, for a general discussion of the issues, Colyer, 2002,
for a discussion of the NAFTA issues, Esty, 1994, for GATT issues and concerns, and ICTSD
and IISD 2003 for WTO processes).  Gardner (1996, p. 228) in an analysis of environmental
regulation and competitiveness of U.S. Agriculture at that time wrote: “To date, the effects of
environmental regulation on trade on trends in U.S. productivity and costs have not been
significant.”  Similarly, Krissoff et al. (1996, p. i) state: “The few empirical studies based on
these concepts have found many of the linkages between trade and the environment to be weak
or the effects small.”  The revised EPA livestock waste disposal regulations described above,
however, have important implications and have induced a spate of publications analyzing their
effects or potential impacts on trade, location, costs and allied issues.  Gardner, however, viewed
the possible impacts of increased regulation as substantial, but thought the political forces for the
environment were to weak to be able to produce much stronger legislation, at least in the absence
of strong evidence that they would be cost effective.
The increasing evidence of the harmful effects of manure disposal from CAFOs did lead
to stronger regulations. Ribaudo et al. (2003) examine general aspects and expected impacts of
the new regulations as they affect use of manure from CAFOs, as well as smaller animal feeding
units.  They see important impacts on producer costs and welfare and, to lesser extent, on
consumer welfare, but do not analyze the impacts on the international competitiveness of the
U.S. livestock industry.  The increased costs could, of course, be significant in determining the
competitive position of U.S. livestock producers.
Much of the recent work has focused on the pork industry, due largely to some severe
environmental problems that have developed in that industry as it became characterized by very
large production units and regional concentration of production, although poultry and other
concentrated livestock operations also are part of the concerns.  This has led to problems in
disposal of the manure due to limited land for disposal and to problems such as spills from
manure holding facilities resulting from large rains and flooding.  Amponsah and Qin (2000, p.
249) in an analysis of the competitiveness of the pork industry, noted that “greater environmental
regulation...could increase costs of producing hogs in the United States leading to lower hog
production.” 
Hayenga et al. (1998a) analyzed the competitiveness of the world’s major pork exporting
countries, specifically the U.S. Canada, Denmark and the Netherlands.  While the chapter on the
United States (Hayenga et al. 1998b) had a paragraph on environmental concerns (pp. 66-67),
the study did not determine the specific impacts of environmental regulations on
competitiveness, perhaps because the new EPA rules had not been formulated or, more likely,
because these were not considered to be important in determining competitiveness.  They did
note that the environmental issues and problems are apt to affect the location of pork production
in the U.S., with anticipated shifts from areas with current high levels of concentration, North
Carolina and Iowa, to “areas like Oklahoma, Utah and Colorado” (p. 67), but did not indicate
any effect of environmental regulations on the competitive position of U.S. pork producers,
which they see as being influenced positively by the trends in efficiency and quality being10
attained by large scale operations (which also are responsible for most of the environmental
problems).
Metcalfe (2002, p. 227) specifically examined the expected impacts of environmental
regulations on the competitiveness of U.S., Canada and the European Union with a mathematical
“equilibrium displacement model” which determines changes in expected exports for estimated
environmental regulation costs.  His findings are that while there are expected increases in costs
from environmental regulations in the U.S., these will not harm the country’s competitive
position mainly because the EU is expected to impose more costly programs.  He states (p. 237),
“Although environmental regulation is expected to increase in the U.S., this does not
significantly affect the competitiveness of U.S. exports.  The relatively more stringent
regulations that may be imposed by the European Union actually help to improve the short-run
competitiveness of U.S. pork producers.”  The cost data used in the study are somewhat
hypothetical, but based on existing studies of waste management costs for large producers in the
U.S. and European studies of their pork industries–U.S. estimates were used for Canada.
Some recent studies have examined the impacts of environmental regulations on the pork
industry, especially on its cost and location in the U.S., without analyzing the effects on
international competitiveness, although often recognizing that they do have international
implications (Kaplan and Johansson 2003; Leuck and Zering 2003).  Major conclusions are that
costs are increased with those being affected by the types of manure management systems used
as well as by the availability of land for disposing of the manure in an environmentally friendly
way.  Leuck and Zering, for example, find that manure handling costs amount to 2.6 percent of
cost of a marketed hog in North Carolina and 1.2 percent in Iowa, levels that could certainly be a
factor in international competitiveness.  They also note that manure handling savings help
account for increased pork production in the western areas of the U.S. and Canada and that there
are economies of scale in some manure management systems.  Kaplan and Johansson have
similar findings, but also note that the USDA can help fund improvements in manure handling
systems through its Environmental Quality Incentive Program (EQIP).  Ribaudo et al. (2003)
indicate that these are sufficient to offset the costs in many of the scenarios they examined.
Adhikari, Harsh and Cheney’s (2003) analysis concludes that environmental compliance costs
have minimal effects on location of production within the United States.  
Although hypothetical, Gray, Harper and Highmore (2001) analyzed the effects of
applying a Pigovian tax on hog production to offset the costs of greenhouse gas emissions by
that enterprise.  They estimate the costs to be $50 per ton of pork meat produced, base the tax on
that figure, and use a trade simulation model to determine the effects under different assumptions
about which countries implement the tax.  If it is worldwide, the effects are minimal with a small
reduction in total production, 1.5 percent with $50 tax and 3.0 percent for a $100 per ton tax.
However, if only the industrialized counties impose the tax, the changes are profound with large
reductions in those countries, but with a nearly complete offset by China and the rest of the
world and practically no reduction in greenhouse gas emissions.
The literature, while not conclusive, indicates that the costs of environmental regulations
are generally relatively small and do not tend to be significant in terms of competitiveness, a
conclusion reached earlier by Krissoff et al. (1996).  Despite this, they can be significant and can
be a factor in the location of production and, hence, international competitiveness. One factor
that tends to mitigate the effects, at least in industrialized countries with strong research
capabilities, is the tendency to develop innovations that minimize the costs of regulation (see
Krissoff et al. 1996; Porter and van de Linde 2002; Ribaudo et al. 2003).  The current work, as11
during the 1990s (see Gardner 1996) is largely aimed at estimating the potential impacts of the
regulations on costs, location, and/or competitiveness.  Little work has been done to analyze the
actual impacts, a situation that is not possible for the current regulations since they have not yet
had time to produce significant effects.  However, the complexities of the real world make it
difficult to separate the effects of changes in environmental regulations from those that occur for
other reasons.
Green Subsidies and Non-Tariff Barriers
The cost of domestic environmental regulations is not the only environmentally related
factor that can affect competitiveness.  Two other relatively common practices can be important
in determining the competitive position of agricultural producers.  These are subsidies for
environmental goods or practices, generally termed green payments, and non-tariff barriers
based on environmental factors, which can take a wide variety of forms from outright bans on
the imports of non-complying goods, increased costs of meeting the required conditions and
certifications, or something as simple as labeling for source or characteristics.  Green payments
are common in the EU, while the U.S. has assisted farmers through cost sharing of conservation
practices since the 1930s when the SCS was established.  Such payments are exempt from the
limits on domestic subsidies developed for the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) during the
Uruguay Round of the GATT, an exemption that would continue under many of the proposals
made for the current, Doha, round of WTO negotiations (Cooper, Peters and Claassen 2003).
Many developing countries, however, view these as just another way that the industrialized
nations subsidize their agriculture in ways that are detrimental to the agriculture of the third
world (Devadoss 2002; Hoekman and Anderson 2000).  The U.S. program was not developed to
affect competitiveness, but it none-the-less has impacts on the ability to export commodities
through both reductions in costs to farmers as well as enhancing the productivity of the
agricultural resource base.  The EU and Japan, however, have far more extensive programs and
have complicated WTO negotiations through the concept of multifunctionality of agriculture,
which includes more than just agricultural production and protecting the environment (see
Paarlberg. Bredahl and Lee 2002; Peterson, Boisvert, and de Gorter 2002).
There was a failed attempt to extend the scope of conservation payments to U.S. farmers
when the farm act was up for renewal in 2002 through a proposed Conservation Security Act,
which would have shifted a substantial part of agricultural income support to a more broadly
based system of conservation payments.  Lohr (2001) argued that this was essential for the
development and competitiveness of the organic food sector in the U.S. because the EU
subsidizes its organic farmers.  Organic farming has grown much faster in the EU and comprises
a larger share of agriculture than in the U.S., 2.9 percent compared with only 0.2 percent in the
U.S.  Lohr (2001 p. 4) concludes, “The superior competitive position held by EU organic
farmers is due to direct agri-environmental payments and cannot be overcome through pure
market mechanisms.”  The U.S. Congress, however, decided to stay with the existing programs
which heavily subsidize conventional grain producers, a situation that some analysts and most
developing countries consider to result in the dumping of grain by the U.S., i.e., the selling of
grain at below the cost of production (see, e.g., Ritchie, Murphy and Lake, 2003).  However,
while these also affect competitiveness, they are not environmental subsidies.
Many nations impose non-tariff barriers (NTBs) on trade for a variety of reasons and,
while the AoA from the Uruguay Round required tariffication of most of the non-tariff barriers12
to trade in agricultural goods, many NTBs still exist under various provisions of the
GATT/WTO agreements, such as Article XX, or are utilized despite being prohibited.  A U.S.
report (USTR 2003a) on foreign trade barriers has a non-exhaustive list of more than fifty
countries plus the EU and Arab League that have NTBs affecting U.S. exports, most with one of
more NTBs that constrain agricultural and food exports.  The most common ones affecting
agriculture are sanitary/phytosanitary provisions designed to protect human, animal and plant
health (see, e.g., Rosson 1998).  These are legitimate if (1) they are based on science and (2)
apply equally to domestic and all foreign producers.  Thus, the U.S., for example, requires
certification that an area is free of particular pests or diseases for the area (country) to export
citrus or some other fruits, vegetables, melons, etc. that are also produced in the U.S.  The
purpose is to prevent the introduction of pests or diseases that would devastate domestic
production.  Thus, everyone banned the import of beef from England at the time of the mad cow
disease outbreak, and the U.S. recently banned imports of beef from Canada after one diseased
cow was found in a herd.  Sometimes, however, such provisions might be used as a way to
protect domestic producers, a situation that is difficult to determine(Beghin, Bureau and Park
2003; O’Conner 2003).  See Colyer (2000) for examples of sanitary/phytosanitary provisions
that affect poultry trade.
Purely environmental concerns are sometimes treated in a similar way, i.e., through
import bans for products produced in ways not considered to be environmentally sound, with
characteristics thought to be environmentally harmful, or as a way to protect endangered species.
Again, under Title XX of the GATT agreement exceptions to the rules prohibiting trade barriers
are allowed for the protection of human, animal and plant health and life, but the interpretation
of this provision is open to question and its use by an individual country is controversial.  The
U.S. bans on imports of tuna not caught in a dolphin safe manner and of shrimp not caught in
ways to protect sea turtles are examples of the use non-tariff barriers for environmental reasons.
These domestic regulations were protested through the GATT system with the U.S. losing an
appeal in the tuna case but winning, partially, in the shrimp case (see Colyer 2002; Eglin 1999,
Esty 1994).  The EU ban on imports of beef fed with hormone feed additives and its virtual ban,
through a moratorium and labeling requirements, on food from genetically modified organisms
are similar provisions with, at least for the latter, environmental reasons or implications–part of
the reason is a fear that native species might cross with the GMO–although the main reason
seems to be health concerns.  It is not known if long term problems might result from consuming
such products; although there is no science to support the claim that they are harmful the EU
invokes the precautionary principle as a justification, since there is no proof that such foods are
either safe or harmful from a long-run perspective.  In addition, the EU has NTBs that affect
U.S. poultry exports (processors use a weak chlorine solution to wash poultry and the EU does
not permit this), animal byproducts from animals not intended for human consumption, certain
by products from cattle sheep and goats due to mad cow disease fears, some gelatin products,
and triple super phosphate which does not meet EU solubility requirements (USTR 2003a).
Similarly Brazil and Argentina have NTBs that prohibit U.S. poultry and other exports, as do a
large number of countries.  Thus, such bans can be effective means to overcome the comparative
advantage that foreign producers might have.  The U.S. has protested the EU moratorium on
GMOs and filed a complaint with the WTO, claiming that it is an illegal restraint on trade
(USTR 2003b).  Clemens and Babcock (2002) document the difficulty of U.S. beef producers
who want to export non-hormone treated beef to the EU.  The costs and difficulty in obtaining
certification make it nearly impossible for the U.S. to compete, and a once profitable market has13
been lost.  Taylor, DeVuyst and Koo (2003) examine the effects of GMO bans on the potential
exports of U.S. wheat and find that, unless a good system of identity is implemented to keep
GMO and non-GMO wheat separate, U.S. exports will suffer. 
Certification and/or labeling of products as to origin or characteristics, such as organic or
dolphin safe, are approaches that can act either as trade barriers or trade promoters.  A label as a
GMO food is probably a barrier to trade since, at least in the EU, such foods are considered
inferior; there are virtually no GMO foods on grocery shelves in the EU since it is believed that
consumers would not purchase them (see Carter and Guerre 2003).  In July 2003, the European
parliament passed stronger legislation requiring labeling and tracability of GMO foods, to
become effective early in 2004, if approved by the 15 member states (Alvarez 2003; ICTSD
2003).  U.S. officials and producer groups have criticized the rquirements and the U.S. is
threatening to file a dispute about this with the WTO.  
However, the label ‘organically grown’ could promote trade since many people prefer
and are willing to pay a premium for such products (see Lohr 2000; Rodriguez and Epperson
2001).  Although there is no science that proves they are superior products, perceptions are
important.  Eco-labeling is becoming an important aspect in the environmental area and has
potential for both improving the environment and enhancing international trade (see, for
example, Athearn 2003; Dawkins 1996; Dobbs et al. 2003; van Ravenswaay and Blend 1997).
As for other approaches, eco-labeling is controversial and may be viewed as a way to help the
environment or as a trade barrier; Dawkins (1996, p. 4), for example, concludes: “By definition,
ecolabeling imparts preferential access...Such discrimination may conflict with GATT’s Most-
Favoured Nation rules and certainly generates new competitive pressures among producers.”
Conclusions
The costs of environmental regulations tend to be relatively small for most agricultural
products.  None-the-less, they can be critical factors in the competitiveness of a product since the
cost advantages of producers in one country are often very slim.  Thus, additional costs derived
from new regulations can be critical in determining the continued importance of exports and of
the maintaining or increasing a nation’s share of the international market.  Governments,
however, often try to assist their industries in overcoming the disadvantages caused by such
added cost through subsidies, tax breaks, technical assistance or in other ways.  In agriculture
these are increasingly taking the form of green payments, which are currently exempt from the
limits imposed on domestic subsidies permitted for agriculture–the U.S. and EU have largely
avoided the impacts of such limits by having set them high enough to avoid immediate problems
and then converting their subsidies to indirect forms, i.e., to subsidies not tied to current
production levels.  In addition to these mechanisms for addressing the environment, there also
has been a selective but subversive process of erecting non-tariff barriers based on
environmental protection issues.  It is often difficult to determine if such measures are really for
protecting the environment or for protecting domestic producers.  They are, none-the-less,
generally effective approaches for achieving environmental objectives and can also be effective
measures to alter competitiveness.
Competitiveness can be either enhanced or diminished by the environmental regimes of
competing nations.  The existence of negative externalities means that prices are lower than
would prevail if all costs where included in the prices of the products.  This is a form of
environmental subsidization and can give an advantage to the country with less strict14
environmental regulations.  However, when regulations are revised to internalize such costs, the
country imposing the regulations can have its competitive edge reduced or eliminated.
Historically, agriculture tended to be exempted from regulations, including
environmental regulations, but with a greater emphasis of environmental issues and problems
this has changed to some degree, especially in the more industrialized countries of the world.
Agricultural producers are now faced with increased regulation with its consequent negative
impacts on costs and competitiveness.  However, this is often mitigated through green payments
or other forms of subsidies that enable agriculture to remain competitive in export markets.  The
U.S. and EU have revised their subsidy schemes to allow them to continue to make large
payments to farmers through the blue and green boxes of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture.
This is especially important as the use of export subsidies is increasingly being limited.  It is,
however, a sophistry to assume that the indirect (income support) subsidies do not distort
agricultural prices and trade.  This is, non-the-less, the position advocated by both the United
States and European Union.
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